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Chapter Four 
Careful Starving: Reflections on (Not) Eating, Caring and Anorexia 
Anna Lavis 
 
Engaging with the volume’s interrogation of what is ‘brought to the table’ by exploring 
interplays between care and food across diverse contexts, this chapter engages with the 
question, why and how does not eating engender or mobilize care? To explore this, it draws on 
data from two qualitative studies within large NHS inner-city mental health hospitals in 
England: The first involved participant observation and interviews with service users in an 
eating disorders inpatient unit (2007-2008) and the second comprised interviews with users of 
eating disorders outpatient, daypatient and inpatient services (2013-2014). By engaging with 
individuals diagnosed with anorexia, alongside clinical and ethical discussions of treatment, 
this chapter traces how competing paradigms of caring and eating, illness and selfhood, touch 
edges in the bodies and lives of individuals living with anorexia. In so doing, it widens the 
question posed above to ask what food and care both are and do in the myriad moments of their 
embodied encounters.   
 In clinical terms, the self-starvation of anorexia nervosa is regarded as lacking in self-
care and propelled by a loss of agency to the illness. This conceptualizes food not only as the 
vector through which to care for an individual with anorexia, but also as that which (re-
)produces their self-care, where that comes to mean, literally, care of the self. Feeding (as eating 
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through caring) is positioned as forging a teleological pathway from a current illness to a future 
anorexia-free self. In the clinic (see Foucault 2003) food is thus, ‘an essential therapeutic 
intervention’ (Powers and Cloak 2013: 82) not only for the integrity of the suffering body but 
also for the recovery of selfhood. However, engaging with individuals with anorexia elucidates 
not only how such care may be experienced as care-less, but also that embodied practices of 
not eating engender alternative modes of attention; anorexia, although recognized by 
participants as an illness, offers ways of caring both for oneself and for Others. Such caring 
through not eating maintains both anorexia and selfhood as the illness maps and matters the 
space of the present moment in ways that render it endurable.   
Reflecting on entanglements between food and care in anorexia, then, constitutes an 
argument for an analysis of anorexia that both engages with the lived vulnerabilities of material 
bodies whilst also going beyond a focus on emaciation as a goal of self-starvation (see also 
Gooldin 2008; Lavis 2013, 2014; Warin 2010). Yet, this is also not to ignore the enormous 
suffering that anorexia can cause or to regard practices of not eating as either fully agential or 
lacking in agency. There is no doubt that eating disorders are often, as Bob Palmer puts it, 
‘miserable and life blighting’ (2014: iii) illnesses, but they also emerge from research 
participants’ narratives as integral to selfhood. As such, the distress that anorexia causes is 
intertwined with individuals’ ways of caring for self and Others both through and in spite of 
the illness. Exploring entanglements of food and care traces the texture and sociality of not 
eating practices, allowing anorexia’s clinical realities to remain acknowledged but ‘bracketed’ 
(see Biehl and Locke 2010: 318) in order that other narratives may also be heard.  
Central to this inquiry is the concept of ‘foodwork’. This has previously been used in 
relation to the feeding practices that are part of caregiving in clinical/residential settings, such 
as with individuals with dementia (cf. Heaven et al. 2013; Pierson 1999). In that context, 
foodwork’s meaning is shaped by the analogous term, ‘bodywork’; this has been described as 
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the ‘ambivalent, hidden work that tends to remain unarticulated within official discourses’ of 
care (Twigg 2006: 136. See also Mol et al. 2010b). Recognizing bodywork as the conceptual 
underpinning of foodwork highlights the emotional labour and boundary-crossing intimacies 
of caring for another’s body in feeding as much as in other activities such as washing (cf. Twigg 
2002; Pols 2013). As such, whilst holding firmly within its parametres a sense of how eating 
and feeding may be vectors of care, the concept of foodwork also highlights the potential 
tensions and regimes of value embedded in such mobilizations of caring. Foodwork is thereby 
a productive concept; it allows us to hold together in one analytical space the (not) eating 
practices of individuals with anorexia, which we might term careful eating, and the feeding 
practices of the clinic, which we could term care-full feeding. Exploring each of these as 
diverse modalities of foodwork offers insights into ways in which performances of caring about 
and for (Fisher and Tonto 1990) entangle food and bodies, and comprise both emotional labour 
and value constructions.  
Yet, while these modalities of caring may sometimes clash, sometimes co-exist and 
often ‘map onto different dimensions’ (Mol 2010: 217), there are also convergences between 
the clinic and individuals with anorexia. Although the chapter begins with mobilizations of 
eating through caring on the eating disorders unit (EDU), and goes on to explore how 
individuals’ practices of not eating mobilize alternative pathways of caring, the flows of 
directionality are not so neat; these directional entanglements between food and care do not 
overlay the two empirical contexts in such a binary way. It is particularly by paying attention 
to shifting positionings of the body that overlaps and mimeses emerge. Food, bodies and care 
are all negotiated in relation to one another. Foodwork therefore emerges as a ‘complex and 
embodied activity’ (Pierson 1999: 130) on the part of the clinic and research participants whilst 
also being related to bodily materialities and embodiment in uncertain ways. Diverging 
conceptualizations of anorexia(s) and selves enacted through food and care produce, as well as 
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intervene in, particular bodies. As such, this chapter echoes Annemarie Mol by asking, ‘what 
kind of matter is food? What kinds of bodies does it feed?’(Mol 2012: 2), and suggests that 
care offers a productive way to explore these questions.  
 
The Clinic: Anorexia and Care 
Self-starvation is arguably central to a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, and it is regarded as 
underpinned by ‘an intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat’ (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013). That an individual with anorexia often ‘neither gives up in the face of the 
negative consequences of eating restraint (not least hunger)’ (Palmer 2014: 5) means that 
anorexia has ‘one of the highest mortality rates of all psychiatric illnesses’ (Bogle 2000: 2). 
Although ‘most patients with anorexia nervosa receive treatment solely on an outpatient basis 
[…] a substantial minority receive inpatient treatment’ (NICE 2004: 6.5.2). It is suggested that 
‘patients may require inpatient care if they are suicidal or have life-threatening medical 
complications […] or weight below 85 percent of their healthy body weight’ (Williams et al. 
2008: 187).  
Treatment can be enforced in England through sectioning under the mental health act 
‘where substantial risk cannot be managed in any other way’ (NICE 2004: 6.5.7.3), although 
only ‘a relatively low proportion of inpatients with anorexia nervosa are placed on formal 
compulsory treatment orders, with reports ranging from 9% to 28%” (Tan et al. 2010: 14). The 
justification for enforcing treatment is underpinned by framing individuals with anorexia as 
lacking the capacity to make decisions regarding treatment as a result of their compromised 
physical state (see Giordano 2005). On the other hand, scholars have argued that accepting an 
individual’s treatment refusal can be ethical, especially if this is an autonomous decision 
against a background of frequent or repeated treatment failure (See Draper 2000; Matusek and 
Wright 2010). Attention on the part of medical ethicists in recent years on values, seeing these 
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rather than individual autonomy as affected by the illness, has also challenged an assumed loss 
of capacity in anorexia, thereby furthering complexity (see Tan and Hope 2008). As such, 
anorexia and its care present to professionals a matrix of complex issues. 
However, it has been suggested that if we accept that ‘anorexia nervosa is not inevitably 
a progressive terminal illness […] it is preferable that treating physicians focus on the 
preservation of life’ (Melamed et al. 2003: 62). Given the risks of severe emaciation and the 
‘intensive care’ (Treasure and Schmidt 2005: 95) required by the starved body, it is clear how 
from a clinical point of view, ‘there is no doubt that the appropriate treatment is food’ (ibid. 
95). Thus, although guidelines state that ‘weight gain is only one outcome of interest” (NICE 
2004: paragraph 6.4.9), arguably ‘the common goal is to re-feed the patient’ (Griffiths and 
Russell 1998: 128), particularly in inpatient treatment. As such, although the heterogeneous 
nature of clinical practices must be acknowledged (see Berg and Mol 1998) with differing 
approaches existing alongside widespread recognition that psychological input is key, it is clear 
that food is a central vector of care. Glimpsed through the regular weigh-ins of outpatient 
treatment, where food consumed since the last appointment is measured through the body, this 
caring through food is most starkly brought to the fore in daycare and inpatient treatment.  
On the eating disorders inpatient unit (EDU) on which I conducted ethnographic 
fieldwork, meals are only one part of an extensive programme of psychological support. Yet a 
pervasive focus on feeding structures the temporal rhythms of the unit as all other activities, 
from recreation to therapy, are arranged around mealtimes. If I bumped into someone I had not 
seen for a few hours and asked them what they ‘had been up to,’ many would reply with 
humour, ‘eating!’ As one participant, Kate1, put it, ‘every day is just, sort of, eating, to be 
honest […]. My whole life is planned around meals’. Likewise, in her interview, Abigail said: 
 
                                                          
1 All names are pseudonyms.  
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They [staff] always tell us ‘you have to eat, it’s normal’. Oh yeah, cos, everyone has a 
sandwich an hour after they’ve had lunch! […] All they do in inpatient treatment is feed 
you, food, food, food, more food….I wish they’d admit that all they do is feed you and 
then let you go. I just wish they’d admit that, or warn you that’s what’s going to happen 
when you go in. They say they’re going to change you and… and help and stuff. But 
they don’t, they just make you fatter (Abigail, inpatient, 2008).  
 
It frequently infuriated participants when staff would not admit that three meals and three 
Snacks amounting to 3,500 calories a day was, as one participant Chloe put it, ‘a shed load of 
food.’ Peter, a temporary psychiatric nurse charged with the task of watching over lunch on his 
first day on the unit exclaimed in a loud whisper to the service user eating next to him, ‘gosh 
you really do have to eat a lot, don’t you!’ He was thoroughly chastized for this in a subsequent 
staff meeting but participants discussed how they ‘appreciated his honesty,’ which was 
contrasted to the discursive norms of the unit. These norms are twofold: On the one hand, as 
Abigail suggests, there is a framing of eating as ‘normal’. On the other, when the amount of 
food was challenged by service users, staff would frequently move away from attempts at 
normalization to instead tell service users that ‘whilst you’re on the EDU, food is medicine’ 
(see also Long et al. 2012). This discursive framing positions mealtimes as clinical events that 
transact a substance – medicine – to be taken for one’s own good. In turn, any refusal to eat on 
the part of service users comes to be seen (and perhaps also felt by staff) as a refusal of their 
care.  
On the EDU such refusals to eat, alongside vocalizations of distress at eating or desire 
to talk about food or weight on the part of service users were often described by staff as ‘the 
anorexia talking’ (see Tan 2003). This conceptualizes such articulations as ensuing from a loss 
of agency to anorexia and sees the illness as a current and temporary addendum to a patient’s 
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‘authentic self’ (Bruch 1974; Tan 2003). It suggests that ‘the individual doesn’t really want to 
restrict her eating, lose weight, or resist treatment - her Real Self has been 
invaded/infected/colonized by an Outside Force’ (Vitousek 2005: 3). Expounding such a clear 
division aims to encourage service users to externalize their anorexia and thereby re-find - 
literally recover – an illness-free self that is conceptualized not only as having become trapped 
in, or effaced by, anorexia, but also as having preceded it. What is advocated, thus, is a change 
back into what one once was and, perhaps, should be again. This elucidates, as does this volume 
more widely, that ‘caring is an activity in which (often moral) valuing is implied’ (Heuts and 
Mol 2013: 130. See also Barnes 2012). 
To claim that not eating, or refusing the caring-as-feeding on the EDU, on the part of 
an anorexic individual is not an autonomous or ‘authentic’ decision in this way does save lives. 
It forms part of the architecture that justifies enforcement of treatment under the mental health 
act, noted above. Yet, this not only is underpinned by a particular value-laden paradigm of 
selfhood and pathology but also offers a way in which to perform this as care; it cleaves a 
conceptual space between anorexia and self into which caring through food can be fitted. This 
-  in relation to Fisher and Tronto’s (1990) four dimensions of care – forges a pathway from 
‘caring about’, framed as attentiveness, to ‘Caring for’, framed as the work of caring (see also 
Tronto 1993; Ungerson 1983). Eating thereby becomes the vector through which selfhood is 
rematerialized through the measurably-expanding body - literally dripped back in through the 
swallowing of every mouthful. The so-called ‘authentic self’ is at once the receiver and also 
goal of care, and is thereby positioned tensely within two temporalities at once. Food, likewise, 
is both the focus of this work, and also made to work in a particular way. 
Exploring these feeding practices as a form of foodwork highlights how nutritional 
value takes precedence over any other aspect of the sticky materiality of food. As food becomes 
medicine, bodily perimeters likewise become linear markers of illness or health, whilst intimate 
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trajectories of food through corporeal spaces are rendered paradoxically ‘immaterial’; food as 
a vector of care does not ‘matter’ in and of itself. In their exploration of care and food in a 
nursing home, Harbers et al. (2002) show how food is constructed differently within ethical 
and medical discussions of food refusal and feeding in the context of dementia. A ‘medical 
attitude to food (appreciating it for its nutritional value)’ (ibid. 216-17) is contrasted to an 
ethical paradigm of food as a ‘means to an end: survival, that may be desirable or not’ (ibid. 
217). On the EDU, as the nutritional value of food also becomes enfolded into survival as an 
end goal, these discourses merge to coalesce into one teleological production of food as care. 
Yet, not only is the sensory materiality of food missing from this, but so too, perhaps, is the 
lived experience of being cared for. 
To suggest this is not to deny the care that is conducted in the clinic; participants 
invariably recognized its value for other service users if not for themselves. However, many 
also described the EDU as ‘terrifying’ and ‘awful’, with mealtimes the focus of their fear and 
distress. Harbers et al. argue that a caring attitude is one ‘which tries to accommodate and 
please a person’ (2002: 217). Arguably the EDU’s foodwork, and its underpinning in ‘the 
anorexia talking’, dislocate both caring and eating from ‘pleasing’ not only in terms of the 
materialities of food but also of the person. The person, it is suggested, is currently absent as 
the present is filled only with anorexia, which must be replaced by food. As such, the anorexia 
of the present is worked on through foodwork in order to teleologically care for the self of the 
future. If, then, care comprises sustained ‘tinkering towards improvement’ (Heuts and Mol 
2013: 125. See also Mol et al. 2010a), it is clear that the EDU’s foodwork does care but that it 
does so in a way that sees improvement as both in the future and in the body.  
Foregrounding the feeding of the body as the central element of care serves to locate 
anorexia in the body. It is clear that the suffering body is arguably one of the few ways that 
anorexia can be clinically ‘grasped,’ in order that individuals may be cared for and so this 
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positioning is pragmatic. However, it also serves to make bodies essentially anorexic, and 
anorexia essentially bodily. Bodies thus are arguably not only made in the literal sense of 
nourishment on the EDU, but also in a more conceptual way; the clinic maps a particular 
paradigm of anorexia through the corporeal depths of digestive geographies (see Willems 
1998). It is against the background of this particular arrangement of self, body and anorexia 
performed by the clinic’s ways of caring that we now turn to engage with narratives of 
individuals with anorexia. From these emerge alternative arrangements of anorexia and 
corporeality, illness and self. 
 
Anorexia as Self-Care 
In her interview Tammy recounted how her anorexia ‘was never kind of a deliberate diet to 
lose weight or anything like that’. She said: ‘it’s never been so much of a body image problem 
for me, it was more just kind of not wanting to eat and kind of regaining control over that’. 
Tammy described how control was gained not only by ingesting as little as possible without 
dying, but also by an accompanying preoccupation with food that we might term ‘virtual 
foodwork’. This was apparent in Lacey’s interview:  
I remember sitting on the bus on the way back from school […] And I got off the bus 
and I realized that I'd spent the entire bus journey counting the calories that I'd eaten 
that day, and that I was going to have to eat when I got home. And then I was thinking 
about the calories that I'd eaten all week and all that kinda stuff and it was like…like 
looking back on that, it was just like I was thinking about probably so I don’t have to 
think about everything else (Lacey, daypatient, 2014).   
 
I have explored elsewhere how practices, such as calorie counting and restricting food intake, 
which both enact and enframe not eating, illustrate that self-starvation does not simply 
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constitute a lack in anorexia. Rather, it comprises continual work in order to engender 
‘relationships of absence’ with food through which anorexia is processually maintained (Lavis 
2013). The illness is therefore both dependent upon, but also of greater significance than, 
practices of not eating. As such, the foodwork of not eating here is, on the one hand, in 
opposition to that of the clinic. Yet these also share, and set to work, a conceptualization of 
food as quantifiable in a way that belies any sense of its sticky materiality. Above, I suggested 
this effacement in the clinic to be produced by the enfolding of a medical model of food into 
an ethical paradigm of saving lives. In participants’ narratives now, food’s materiality is again 
obscured in its intertwining with particular productions of value. However, these relate to the 
space of the present rather than future, as foodwork emerges as a way of producing anorexia to 
care for the self. This takes us beyond the clinic’s binaries of self and Other, future and present.  
In her interview, Josie, described her self-starvation and the virtual foodwork that 
accompanied it as: 
A distraction and an escape from the real world, the pressures, the worries, the stress, 
things that I couldn’t control, things that I didn’t know how to handle. It’s a really easy 
thing to focus on and to let take up your mind […]. It was something to focus on that 
didn’t hurt, that I could control when I couldn’t sort out some of the other issues (Josie, 
inpatient, 2014).  
 
That not eating offers a way of controlling and numbing emotions is recognized; anorexia has 
been described as ‘a functional coping strategy in which control of eating serve[s] as a means 
of coping with ongoing stress and exerting control’ (Eivors et al. 2003: 96. See also Treasure 
et al. 2007). Yet these accounts of ‘counting calories’, and thereby ‘escap[ing] from the real 
world’, also suggest that the numbness offered by virtual and actual self-starvation goes beyond 
the control of emotions. By letting anorexia ‘take up your mind’, as Josie put it, there would 
11 
 
seem here to be an agential absenting of the self that both maps onto and yet, importantly, also 
contrasts with the conceptualizations of self and illness in the clinic, above. In her interview, 
Claudine said:   
You just sit there and sometimes it [anorexia] manifests itself in a sort of numbness and 
I’ll just lie on my bed, stare into space and I’ll sleep a lot or something like that. I just 
want to stop thinking and you do almost zone out as it were (Claudine, inpatient, 2008). 
 
In many participants’ accounts there is a slippage between this zoning out through anorexia 
described by Claudine and the illness as a space to zone into. Anorexia was described by one 
participant as ‘my space’ and another as a ‘my little bubble’, with Emila saying ‘it's almost like 
it's a world that you live in, that's separate from everybody else’. In her interview Nita described 
this spatiality in terms of safety. She said that anorexia had ‘been a safety net for so long, 
removing it is the scariest thing in the world. […] I think that's what has stopped me getting 
better completely and being fully recovered, is that it's a safety net that I don’t want to remove’. 
She continued, ‘it becomes so much a part of you’ and asked, without it, ‘what would I be?’  
The sense here of anorexia as a ‘safe space’ that offers ‘retreat’ is reminiscent of Ellen 
Corin’s discussions of ‘positive withdrawal’ (Corin 2007) in psychosis. Corin suggests that 
withdrawal signifies a way to ‘defend an inner space’ (ibid. 283) through the construction of a 
kind of ‘psychic skin that parallels the social skin’ (ibid. 283). Reflecting on anorexia as 
‘psychic skin’ illustrates that the illness, as a space of numbness or retreat, is not empty; it does 
not comprise a gap where the ‘authentic self’ used to, or should, be. Rather, in participants’ 
accounts anorexia stills the present in a way that forges an alternative subjectivity of space and 
being; this is a space for and of selfhood whilst also, importantly, being recognized as a space 
forged through illness. Yet, this is not to see the self simply as suspended or held within 
anorexia. Rather, selfhood ‘manifests’, to borrow Claudine’s word, within and with the illness. 
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Whilst poignantly elucidating how the cleaving attempts to remove anorexia from self on the 
part of the clinic may be experienced as care-less rather than care-full, Nita’s questioning of 
‘what would I be’ without anorexia, evinces an ‘intersubjective fusion’ (Jackson 2002: 340) 
with the illness that runs through many participants’ narratives. Thus, if the foodwork of not 
eating processually maintains anorexia for participants, it also maintains their sense of self. In 
so doing, it is felt to be a modality of self-care that mediates how they live and move through 
the present moment. 
Kate described anorexia as ‘how I do things. You do it quietly, you do it on your own’. 
Likewise, Elisa said of anorexia that it ‘would be probably the only thing in my life that’s been 
constant for the last, I don’t know, seven or eight years or something and I guess it’s become a 
part of me and a part of my routine’. These descriptions of anorexia as ‘part of my routine’ and 
‘how I do things’, afford a glimpse into how, to participants, anorexia may be a way of making 
and mapping the space of the present; not eating thereby ‘craft[s] more bearable ways of living 
with, or in, reality’ (Mol 2008: 53). The foodwork of not eating, albeit ambivalently, mediates 
how participants encounter the worlds around them; it processually reproduces an illness that 
offers a way to withdraw from, or interact with, these. Such a conceptualization of the illness 
as ‘crafting’ the present is contrasted in some accounts with the uncertainty signified by the 
future. As Elisa put it, ‘you don’t quite know what the future holds’ and, to her, this emphasized 
anorexia’s safety. Thus, if caring comprises ‘persistent tinkering in a world full of complex 
ambivalence and shifting tensions’ (Mol et al 2010 B: 14), anorexia offers a way of caring for 
the self that navigates tensions; or, as Leila put it, ‘anorexia looks after you’.  
This sense of self-care through anorexia clearly diverges from the clinic’s 
conceptualization of the illness. But there are also overlaps not only between ways of caring 
but also between how the clinic and participants envision the object of care. In the EDU the so-
called ‘authentic self’ was at once the receiver and also goal of care, which positioned it within 
13 
 
two temporalities at once. Here, as anorexia itself emerges as a modality of care, the self is 
cared for in the space of the present moment, but in a way that may not offer any other 
temporality. Caring through not eating performs statis rather than teleology, with all the 
ambiguity that ‘stasis’ suggests.  
There is a precariousness to anorexia as a modality of self-care; its safe space is 
potentially consuming. Josie illustrated this in her interview by saying, ‘I felt like I wasn’t 
existing’. This slippage from a space of selfhood to one of effacement was also described by 
Lacey, who said the process from one to the other was ‘like rolling down a slope’. Yet, despite 
the distress expressed at this sense of a loss of agency to, and sometimes betrayal by, anorexia, 
participants do not always wish to give up this particular modality of self-care; rather, their 
narratives evince an accommodation to the ways in which caring may be a deeply painful 
activity. This was clear in Hadia’s interview when she recounted how she would sometimes sit 
and just, as she put it, ‘be alone with anorexia’; she described feeling ‘safe’ and ‘okay’ in this 
space. But, Hadia also described how she would sometimes feel her anorexia becoming too 
strong, too entrapping in a way that ‘pushed [her] out’. Yet, instead of this statement signifying 
a wholesale alignment with clinical conceptualizations, within it diverging paradigms touch 
edges before quickly parting ways. In order to care for herself within this entrapment, Hadia 
described working harder at her foodwork to processually reproduce the space of her illness 
and align herself with(in) it.  
It was arguably therefore her experience of anorexia’s narrowing of possibility that led 
Hadia to continually re-invent it as ‘[her] space’. In this, she illustrates that ‘people make-do 
with what they have’ (de Certeau 1984: 18), whilst also showing that anorexia as a mode of 
self-care could be regarded, following Plato, as a ‘pharmakon’ (2005; Derrida 2004); it is not 
only both remedy and poison at once, but, importantly, remedy for its own poison. Evincing 
the doubledness encapsulated by the preposition ‘through’, self-care through anorexia sees 
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anorexia as at once a vector of caring, but also as something that is difficult to live through. 
These become enfolded as participants like Hadia work harder to catch up with anorexia so 
that it may continue to ‘look after’ them. The illness is thus a way ‘to live with what would 
otherwise be unendurable’ (Fischer 2007: 423), where the unendurable may be at once cause 
and effect. 
Therefore, care-full dynamics of ordering and producing the everyday through the 
foodwork of not eating have been seen to enable a particular selfhood to emerge, albeit it 
painfully and precariously, within and through anorexia. This, however, does not simply 
constitute a reversal of the clinic’s paradigm of selfhood as in opposition to anorexia. Rather, 
the processual mapping of the present in participants’ discussions points to an imagining of 
selfhood that is less bounded. Although anorexia as skin and space seem de-relational, there is 
a complex sociality to many participants’ narratives. Returning to Corin’s metaphor of ‘psychic 
skin’ (2007: 283) illuminates this sense of connection as well as disconnection. As Michel 
Serres reminds us, skin is porous as ‘in it, through it, with it, the world and my body touch each 
other’ (2008: 80). Therefore, extending the existing sense of anorexia as that which maps inner 
worlds, the final section will now explore a more relational ordering enacted by participants 
through the careful sociality of foodwork. If, in rematerializing the self through the body, the 
clinic performed care in a paradoxically dual and yet embodied way, in this discussion of 
anorexia as care the body has hovered at the periphery of the page, seemingly unrelated to 
anorexia or food. By now turning to explore how not eating cares for Others, troubled and 
troubling bodily materiality is brought, finally, into analysis.  
 
Careful Sociality: (Not) Eating (and) Others 
In her interview, Rashida described how she had begun to self-starve after her father had been 
hospitalized for a terminal illness. She poignantly recounted having watched him ‘shrinking 
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away’ and feeling that if she could ‘just eat less than him’, so that he would never become 
smaller than her, ‘things would be okay’. Likewise, Elisa said of her sister’s hospitalization 
when they were children:  
What I really remember hating when she was ill is seeing everyone else at school and 
all of her friends and all of my friends carrying on as normally and being healthy and 
laughing with each other and I really hated that because, you know, my sister was in 
hospital, it was like the end of my world, um, and I think I want, I wanted that to be 
marked and almost by punishing myself and by making things bad for me I was marking 
that and almost not putting myself in the same boat as her but giving myself something, 
something bad because I would have preferred it was me to be ill (Elisa, outpatient, 
2014). 
 
Both Rashida and Elisa’s accounts echo the discussions above of not eating as a modality of 
gaining control, particularly in emotionally distressing situations. Yet, they also evince the 
painful partiality of such control, as not eating may successfully map and maintain the space 
forged inside anorexia but is powerless beyond this. We might therefore be tempted to suggest 
that here we are confronted with the limits of conceptualizing – or even, experiencing - anorexia 
as caring. Yet, reflecting again on not eating as active foodwork takes us beyond this to 
illuminate the place of emotional labour in this discussion; this elucidates how food, and its 
lack, are set to work here in a way that performs caring about Others. 
  In contrast to explorations of the caring implicit in commensality (see Carsten 1997), 
Rashida and Elisa’s narratives frame the sharing of a lack of food as engendering threads of 
care between bodies and persons. If care is at once ‘both a practice and a disposition’ (Tronto 
1993: 104) and the last section’s discussion of self-care explored practices, care emerges here 
as an embodied disposition. In their felt powerlessness to care for their family members in any 
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other way – to map the future or, indeed, present for their loved ones - Rashida and Elisa 
entangle their bodies into a performance of care, enacting a mimetic alignment. Elisa’s words 
that she ‘would have preferred it was [her] to be ill’ frame her not eating as a ‘somatic mode 
of attention’ (Csordas 1993). That this may be at once ‘attentive’ (Fisher and Tronto 1990) and 
yet not necessarily fully agential resonates through Elisa’s words above, and elucidates that not 
eating may be a way caring about in the face of an inability to care for.  
 Although Rashida and Elisa’s performances of care are embedded in the intimacies of 
familial relations, a similar mimetic alignment of suffering bodies, but across geographical 
distances, occurs in other participants’ narratives of not eating. Some described how they had 
been chastized as children for not finishing their plates with variations on the line ‘think of the 
starving children’. They related this to a need to not consume ‘too much’, which was enacted 
through anorexia. Similarly, in her interview, Juno likened her not eating to the sponsored 24-
hour famine established by the charity Vision UK, in which participants raise money to aid 
victims of famine. Recent work has illuminated how eating is an act that engenders webs of 
sociality between eating bodies across spatial and temporal distances (Abbots and Lavis 2013). 
This has extended discussions of commensality to explore food as a substance that travels 
across distances, be those affective, material or both. Here Juno’s words, instead, evince the 
sociality of shared absence; not eating mobilizes caring as an engagement with Others that 
seeks to ‘maintain’ or ‘repair’ the world (Tronto 1993: 102–103). It signifies an attentiveness 
forged through ‘recognizing the needs of those around us’ (ibid. 127). It was Milla who most 
deeply expressed this during her interview; she described her anorexia as both ‘an illness’ and 
also ‘a sort of testimony to the wrongness of the world’. In so doing, she referred to the 
philosophy of Simone Weil. It was Weil herself who wrote about attention that it ‘consists in 
suspending thought, leaving it available, empty, and ready to be entered by its object’ (Weil in 
Little 1988: 130). As such, together, ‘testimony’ and ‘attention’ articulate a sense of self-
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suspension that navigates between anorexia as self-protection and self-loss, whilst also 
intertwining these with the care of Others. Milla recounted how she was told she was ‘too 
global’ by staff in the EDU who felt she should ‘focus on [her]self’: 
I know I’ve been told over and over again ‘your, your protest won’t stop exploitation 
in the third world just because you know, you boycott coca cola it isn’t going to stop 
them cutting down the rainforests’…. Erm and, ‘what do you think the starving people 
would say if they saw you doing this to yourself?’ All this stuff. Of course I know, of 
course I know (Milla, inpatient, 2008). 
 
It is perhaps as anorexia compromises conditions of possibility in the mingled protection and 
engulfment, seen above, that caring for Others offers a way of being oneself through the 
alternative becoming of mimesis. As such, linking one’s self-starvation to other suffering 
bodies across geographical distances also reinforces a particular modality of self-production. 
It allows anorexia to be reinforced by the body of an imagined Other. The illness thereby 
becomes, at once, legitimized and moralized.  
Scholars have previously explored anorexia in relation to cultural discourses of 
morality, arguing that ‘anorexics [are] misguided moralists’ (O’Connor and Van Esterik 2008: 
7). It has been suggested that eating disorders ‘are the symptoms of ordinary morality, which 
is just being taken seriously – or more seriously than usual’ (Giordano 2005: 8–9). Yet, with a 
few exceptions (see Gooldin 2008; Warin 2010), such discussions have tended to focus on 
anorexia’s intersections with the wider cultural valuing of ‘purity’ and ‘lightness’ (Giordano 
2005: 127) in a Euro-American context. Here, instead, it is food itself (and its lack), rather than 
the secondary effect of this on bodies, that emerges as a ‘moral choice’ (Coveney 1999: 33). 
As self-starvation maps nascent forms of careful sociality, it becomes ‘an attempt to meet the 
other morally’ (Noddings 2013: 707). This intersects with wider enactments of ethically 
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concerned consumption (see Miele and Evans 2010) whilst also framing not eating as ‘a moral 
achievement’ (Tronto 1993: 127). 
Yet, drawing on a moral framework in this way is also performative; it serves not only 
to mime and mediate Others but also produce them, mapping other bodies and other hungers 
over those of participants. As such not eating as a somatic modality of attending to the suffering 
of others enacts a complex interplay of visibility and invisibility. We saw this in the entangling 
of Rashida’s body with her father’s, above, as her not eating sought to nourish him by effacing 
her. Moreover, in this wider discussion of care in a global context, caring through not eating 
simultaneously forges links between bodies based on suffering, whilst also recognizing  - or, 
perhaps, feeling - only the suffering of the Other’s body. This gains a hyper-visibility whilst 
that of participants is maintained as peripheral. The doubledness and dualism in this is 
elucidated by turning to one participant, Michelle’s, slippers. 
‘What can one say, I ask, about a slipper?’ says Michel Serres (2008: 64). In the EDU 
many things were asked and uttered about Michelle’s slippers. These were old, worn and not a 
little battered; her toe came through the end of one and the stripes had faded to grey. Staff often 
tried to convince Michelle to buy a new pair of slippers, drawing her attention to their visual 
appearance, which they described as ‘uncared for.’ To staff, thus, keeping these slippers was 
indicative of a wider lack of self-care. By delinking Michelle’s slippers from anything but her 
body and her anorexia through this paradigm of self-care, the clinic thereby bound these 
together, as we saw above. Yet, Michelle felt that her slippers ‘would do’ as to replace them 
when they still ‘worked as slippers,’ as she put it, would be ‘wasteful.’ To Michelle her slippers 
were precisely ‘a place of seams, mixture and marriage’ (Serres 2008: 66), entangled with her 
wider ethic of care as ‘not consuming too much’. Michelle justified keeping her slippers by 
saying:  
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The way society is now it just seems so complex and in terms of consumerism […] 
there’s this constant effort to produce a new variety or just something different. Or just, 
‘new extra this’ – even cornflakes, you know, ‘extra crunchy’ with ‘extra added this’…. 
‘added whatever’, something that people think might be good for their health or 
improve their teeth of whatever…. Or types of teabags! It’s just ridiculous the amount 
of choice. And there is just such a lot of waste and it creates, whether it’s about food or 
anything, it creates an attitude that it’s ok. But the amount of waste we produce is just 
ridiculous and it’s actually shameful I think. Some people elsewhere would do anything 
for the minutest thing we throw away (Michelle, inpatient, 2008).  
 
Thus, to conceptualize Michelle’s footwear only as metonymic of a lack of self-care 
enacted through not eating would privilege the visual narrative of both her slippers and her 
body over her voice. This would, perhaps, be care-less rather than care-full. Yet, the staff’s 
discussions of Michelle’s slippers have also highlighted a tension between embodiment and 
disembodiment that has resonated throughout this discussion of careful sociality. On the one 
hand, it has become clear that anorexia is about far more than a quest for corporeal emaciation; 
complex, relational and intimate practices of caring have shown the illness to be embodied and 
yet not about the body as a visual entity. As, at once, a profoundly ‘somatic mode of attention’ 
(Csordas 1993) to others that forges affective links through bodies and their suffering, anorexia 
has also paradoxically emerged as something that effaces the body and enacts dualism. As not 
eating as self-care and careful sociality are contrasted to the clinic’s vision of a lack of self-
care within anorexia, competing paradigms of care not only frame bodily materialities in 
diverging ways but also ‘interfere’ (Haraway 2008) with these. Bodies become caught up in 
practices of caring for self and Others through food in ways that engender moments of 
encounter between anorexic ways of caring and those of the clinic.  
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In her interview Eva described the effects starvation had had on her body; she recounted 
bones so sharp that when she turned over in bed she felt them scratching against her skin from 
within and described how her hair had fallen out and her skin dried to flakes. Before entering 
the EDU she had been frightened that she was about to go blind because her vision was so 
blurred. Here the somatic vulnerability of Eva’s suffering body does seem, in line with the 
clinic’s claims, to disrupt the caring performed by anorexia. Indeed, Tronto argues that ‘in 
order to recognize the needs of others, one must first be attentive to one’s own needs for care’ 
(1993: 131). Here then, as in Michelle’s slippers, caring for Others and self would seem to be 
difficult to align (see also Abbots, this volume). Yet, Eva said of this, ‘anorexia’s got nothing 
to do with my body. The physical bit’s just a symptom of my mind’. In this simultaneous 
foregrounding of bodily suffering and yet repudiating of the body as ‘important’ to anorexia, 
felt corporeal materiality is re-framed as outside the relationship – the careful sociality, perhaps 
-  between anorexia and self. This disallows embodied suffering to disrupt caring. Echoing 
Hadia’s reconfigurations in relation to a felt loss of agency to anorexia, above, here self-care 
and careful sociality are enfolded and, once again, placed beyond the painful as well as 
quantifiable perimetres of the body.  
This delinking of body and self, importantly, also demonstrates how diverging ways of 
caring about, for, through and within anorexia, seen throughout this chapter, converge. This is 
because it allows Eva to engage in clinical treatment, seeking care for her bodily suffering 
whilst also holding onto anorexia and its ways of caring. She described feeling ‘grateful’ that 
the clinic had enforced her eating and thereby ‘taken away the pain, but not anorexia’. We see, 
thus, how within the intimacies of bodily depths, diverging paradigms and scales of care co-
exist and that caring perhaps always entails negotiation of co-existing as well as competing 
‘goods’ (see Mol et al. 2010a). Eva allows herself to be cared for in a way that she feels to 
maintain her anorexia and selfhood. That this permits the illness to continue mapping the space 
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of the present in ways that care for Eva, warrants recognition as we listen to her narrative. Yet 
at the same time, it perhaps also suggests that anorexia’s ‘careful sociality’ may be, most of all, 
with itself.  
  
Conclusion 
It is viscerally clear why, in anorexia, ‘the story of illness that trumps all others’ (Frank 1997: 
5) is the clinical. Yet, this chapter has sought to show that there are other stories that need 
attending to. For both the clinic, and individuals with anorexia, not eating keeps the illness 
present. Yet what is kept present, and indeed effaced, diverges. To the clinic, anorexia signifies 
a lack; the present is effaced by illness so that clinical care is both of – and has as its goal the 
recovery of – the ‘authentic self’. Through a food-as-medicine paradigm, eating becomes a 
linear modality of rematerializing this self, envisaged as lost through self-starvation. In 
contrast, to some individuals with anorexia, the illness offers a way of living through the 
present; this is forged and mapped by, but also ambivalently contained within, anorexia. In 
these narratives, anorexia and self cannot be distinguished so neatly, as the illness offers a space 
of and for selfhood whilst also performing care about and for (imagined) Others. In the 
introduction, I called on an idea of bracketing to allow recognition of the clinical realities of 
anorexia whilst opening up a space in which to explore beyond these. As the chapter has 
unfurled, we have seen how these are also in tension in the lives of participants; illness and 
selves, bodies and pain, eating and caring, are all divergently and procesually positioned and 
bracketed in relation to one another. In particular, the materialities of foods and bodies have 
shifted in and out of view as ways of caring have engendered interplays of visibility and 
invisibility. Alongside this troubled and troubling materiality, it is perhaps both the distress and 
intermittent loss of agency in participants’ lived experiences of anorexia that most 
problematizes an idea of the illness as care. Yet, it is also both of these that underpin its 
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importance; caring is cyclical as care of the self necessarily instigates caring for anorexia so 
that it may continue to ‘look after you’. Thus, this chapter has perhaps most shown that caring 
about individuals with anorexia depends ‘to an important extent, on one’s sense of empathy 
and compassion for a person’s suffering’ (2005: 261) as well, perhaps, on listening. By tracing 
along some of the sharper edges of both eating and caring, the discussion has sought to forge 
understandings of how care, food and anorexia are all lived and felt, resisted and reconfigured, 
in ways that disrupt but also ‘matter’ the intimacies of individual bodies, selves and everyday 
lives.  
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